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Book Reviews
Contemporary Strategy
The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy:
Why Strategic Superiority Matters
By Matthew Kroenig
Reviewed by Dr. Stephen Cimbala, professor of political science, Penn
State, Brandywine

M

atthew Kroenig argues nuclear superiority, “a military nuclear
advantage over an opponent,” matters—especially for the United
States (3). Nuclear superiority requires more than the possession of a
secure second-strike capability. As he explains, nuclear superiority is a
situation in which a state’s expected costs in a nuclear war are lower than
its adversary’s, even if the expected costs are high for both states.
Kroenig states, “A robust nuclear posture reduces a state’s expected
cost of war, increasing its resolve in international political disputes, and
thus providing it with a coercive advantage over states more vulnerable
to a nuclear exchange” (3–4). He makes four contentions: a US posture
of nuclear superiority is more likely to contribute to international
stability than a position of nuclear parity; there is no observable link
between the size of the US nuclear arsenal and the proliferation of
nuclear weapons among other states; nuclear arms races are uncommon
and have sometimes proved to be advantageous to the United States;
and a robust US nuclear force is costly, but affordable. In addition, the
US nuclear arsenal must support extended deterrence commitments
to more than thirty other states, including the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization. These arguments are supported by many references to the
literature and original quantitative analysis.
One of Kroenig’s more interesting points is that, regardless of
academic debates, actual US nuclear strategy and force structure have
been based on the assumption that relative nuclear advantage matters.
Forces in excess of the minimum requirements for assured destruction
or assured retaliation have been deployed during and after the Cold War,
partly on the assumption that a state with superior nuclear capabilities
will have an advantage in a competitive brinkmanship during a nuclear
crisis. But it is also true forces within American domestic politics have
driven much of this nuclear buildup during and after the Cold War.
More than one US secretary of defense has found congressional
interest in weapons systems as a challenge to rational defense planning.
In addition, the assumption that larger nuclear forces necessarily confer
advantages in coercive bargaining is contested by some of the important
research literature. The historical research and quantitative analysis
of Todd S. Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann, for example, found,
“Compellent threats from nuclear states have not been more successful
than threats from nonnuclear states, even after accounting for other
factors that influence coercive diplomacy outcomes. Moreover, this
finding is robust to a wide variety of measurements of nuclear superiority,
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compellence success, and possible selection effects” (Nuclear Weapons and
Coercive Diplomacy, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017, 95).
Another issue is whether nuclear superiority can be conceptualized
as narrowly as a relative military advantage over the opponent.
Qualitative issues, including the character and experience of a state’s
political and military leadership, are also important in the bargaining
games of nuclear deterrence and compellence. It mattered that the more
experienced John F. Kennedy was in charge during the Cuban missile
crisis of 1962, compared to the less experienced John F. Kennedy who
presided over the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961. Kennedy had learned
important lessons about crisis management in the intervening months
including the need to test expert opinion and policy advocacy against
the realities of brinkmanship and the expected costs of a nuclear war
even for the winner. Studies of the Cuban missile crisis have shown
US participants were less impressed by their relative nuclear superiority
over the Soviet Union than they were by the absolute destruction that
might be inflicted on the United States by Soviet missiles launched from
Cuba—even if more destructive US responses against the Soviet Union
were to follow.
In discussing these matters, it is also necessary to keep in mind
the distinction between nuclear declaratory and employment policies.
America’s nuclear employment policy has usually called only for
capabilities in excess of deterrence, including limited nuclear options,
intrawar deterrence, escalation control, and escalation dominance, as
well as war termination under favorable circumstances. Accordingly,
US nuclear targeting has included enemy nuclear forces, leadership
and command and control systems, conventional military forces, and
economic industrial recovery targets. The challenge has been matching
available policy guidance, which is sometimes vague, to national strategy
as understood in the defense establishment and then to specific war
plans and target assignments. But the paradox was the more ambitious
the plans and employment policies, the more demanding were the
requirements placed upon the command and control systems—
arguably more vulnerable and fragile to imminent destruction than the
forces themselves.
In this regard, the author might have better served his purpose by
arguing nuclear superiority should not be conflated with larger numbers
of offensive weapons. True nuclear superiority would require meaningful
advantages in offensive weapons together with preclusive defenses
that would limit the other side’s second-strike retaliation to acceptable
levels—as well as flexible and enduring command and control systems
and substantial capabilities for intrawar deterrence and escalation
dominance. On the other hand, a self-evident US sprint for nuclear
superiority could encourage compensatory responses from Russia and
China, including the possibility of a renewed arms race. There is no last
move in strategy, nuclear or otherwise.
America’s nuclear policy and force structure are parts of a larger
national policy and strategy matrix. In this regard, nuclear strategic
planning will have to grapple with the need to preserve US military
advantages in the commons of space and cyberspace—for example,
future space-based weapons could be used as interceptors for boostphase missile defenses, and left-of-launch cyberweapons have already
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been employed against ballistic missile launch sites. Space enables
US command and control, communications, computers, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance on which both nuclear and
conventional forces depend. Therefore, an integrated cross-domain
strategy for deterrence and defense with nuclear and conventional
weapons will require hard choices about investments.
True nuclear superiority as defined above is not “over the horizon”
for American or other nuclear weapons states, and not only because
of daunting technical challenges in the way. There is also humanity to
consider. Even small nuclear wars are perverse contradictions of the
relationship between war and politics that Clausewitz emphasized.
Beyond deterrence, there is only uncertainty. Notwithstanding these
caveats, this study is worthwhile for military professionals and for other
students of national security policy in challenging nuclear deterrence
and arms control orthodoxy. Kroenig forces us to think more clearly
about how much is enough.

The West’s East: Contemporary Baltic
Defense in Strategic Perspective
By Lukas Milevski
Reviewed by Mr. Ben S. Wermeling, a graduate of George Washington
University’s master of arts program in security studies and a Department of
Defense contractor

E

ven after entering the European Union and NATO, the Baltic
countries have rarely been part of the West’s strategic calculus.
This focus changed in 2014 due to Russian aggression in Ukraine, which
Moscow attempted to justify by claiming its actions were in the interest
of Ukraine’s Russian minority. Fearing similar Russian designs on their
vulnerable members, analysts within the NATO defense community
quickly made the study of the Baltic region and its security a top priority.
Lukas Milevski notes there has not yet been a comprehensive study of
Baltic defense from a strategic perspective informed by the geopolitical
history of the region. His book, The West’s East, aims to provide such a
study. Informed by this analysis, Milevski argues preparing to defend the
Baltic states is in NATO’s best interest because assuming Russia will not
attack is wishful thinking rather than strategy.
The book begins with a succinct summary of the Baltic region’s
geopolitics and history. Even prior to the existence of Estonia, Latvia,
and Lithuania, the region was composed of small states struggling
to maintain their independence from more powerful neighbors.
Throughout the overview, several themes, such as the active role these
countries play in securing and maintaining their independence, are
emphasized. Another theme relates to the circumstances in which the
Baltic states can maintain their independence. Historically, the countries
could be independent if the great powers surrounding the states were
weakened or disinterested.
The aftermath of World War I exemplifies these themes. The newly
independent Baltic states used military force to fend off German and
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Russian attempts at reconquest. The victory was possible due to the
status of the regional powers. Russia was wracked by civil war, and
Poland was defending itself from Russia. Meanwhile, Germany was in
the process of surrendering and handling internal unrest.
Finally, Milevski emphasizes the varying strategic significance of
the Baltic Sea. At times, the region was an open and transitory route
for shipping valuable materials from Eastern Europe’s hinterland. But
the sea could also be blockaded for economic pressure. Another feature
is the contrast of sanctuary versus vulnerability. For the German navy
during the World Wars, the Baltic Sea offered a sanctuary from its
stronger counterparts; however, modern long-range precision weaponry
turned it into a place of danger.
A set of historical analogies currently employed to understand the
current situation in the Baltics is also provided. One analogy compares
Russia’s foreign policy to that used by Nazi Germany to claim territories
with large ethnic German populations. Another involves Russian
President Vladimir Putin and the late Soviet leader Yury Andropov.
Milevski argues these analogies are especially useful to policymakers
unfamiliar with the region’s history. Although this is a unique approach,
the necessity of such depth is unclear considering the author views
analogies as having limited utility.
The book also addresses the strategic dispositions of countries in
the eastern Baltic region and in NATO. In addition to Russia and the
NATO countries, the book analyzes the potential role and capabilities
of Sweden and Finland, which are sometimes overlooked. Of note is
the consideration of the nonmilitary vulnerabilities of the Baltic states,
namely, demographic decline, Russian energy reliance, propaganda,
and subversion. The section on Russia begins with an examination of
Russian geopolitical thought and strategic culture. Milevski writes the
current tenor of geopolitical thought emphasizes Russia’s unique position
as a Eurasian power, as well as themes of defense from instability and
a perceived threat of Western aggression. Moscow’s attempts to sow
discord among Russians living in the Baltic states are the focus of the
section on Russia’s regional policy. A final section discusses Russian
military reforms and recent operations in Syria and Ukraine.
With this information, the author assesses military strategy in a
hypothetical war between Russia and NATO over the Baltic. Although
deterrence would be preferred, it is an uncertain prospect. In the event
of a conflict, Milevski believes the warfare strategy used in Ukraine, is
unlikely to succeed due to less favorable circumstances in the Baltic.
Moscow, therefore, will likely prefer a conventional invasion that
disrupts the balance of forces in the Baltic and allows Russia to deny or
hinder NATO attempts to access the region.
A strength of the book is the consideration of the political
implications of such a hypothetical conflict, which could also leave
NATO at a disadvantage. From this perspective, the Alliance would
need to consider the risks of potentially escalatory strikes on Russian
territory versus leaving it as a sanctuary. The Alliance would likely
struggle to terminate a war favorably even if the Baltics were secured, as
Russia may have few incentives to stop fighting.
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The conclusion of the book analyzes NATO’s Baltic defense
requirements through the lens of a strategic theory developed by scholar
Colin S. Gray. Considerations in the event of a conflict that are briefly
elaborated on include political goals, doctrine, and logistical challenges.
Given Russia’s strong regional capabilities and its possibly hostile
intentions, Milevski concludes it is prudent to be prepared for full-scale
war. While Milevski’s observation provides a reasonable analysis and
conclusion, it provides little guidance on actual requirements.
The West’s East has numerous strengths. Most notable is the
comprehensive nature of the research, which encompasses geopolitics,
history, the status of regional militaries, and strategic analysis. Each
of these perspectives offers unique insights that could have been
missed if Milevski had only focused on contemporary diplomacy and
military operations.
But there are several shortcomings. A geographical overview of the
region is strangely placed at the very beginning of the book. The status
of Belarus is given limited consideration despite its potentially important
role in the region. A deeper analysis of the hypothetical war would have
been useful, but perhaps is more in the realm of tactics rather than
strategy. Despite these modest problems, the book is an impressive and
timely strategic analysis that is recommended reading for all who are
examining Baltic security issues.
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Military Effectiveness
Rebel Power: Why National Movements
Compete, Fight, and Win
By Peter Krause
Reviewed by Dr. John P. Sullivan, Senior Fellow, Small Wars Journal-El Centro

N
Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 2017
264 pages
$89.95

onstate conflict dominates contemporary discourse on war and peace
yet a comprehensive framework for understanding the dynamics
of insurgencies, revolutions, and national movements—collectively
known as rebels. Some rebellions succeed and others fail. Many factions,
competing groups, and challengers seek to dominate rebel movements.
In Rebel Power, Peter Krause, an assistant professor of political science
at Boston College and a research affiliate in the MIT Security Studies
program looks at the factors that determine who wins and loses in one
form of rebellion: national movements.
Specifically, Krause assesses the organizational factors contributing
to the success of national movements. To do so he employs four case
studies of well-documented national movements: two that succeeded
and two that have yet to achieve their full goals but have experienced
partial successes. The cases examined are Israel, Palestine, Algeria, and
Ireland. In Israel, the Zionist movement was successful. Conversely,
the Palestinian national movement has yet to achieve its goals. The
Algerian national movement dealt a death knell to Algérie Française, while
the Irish nationalist movement achieved a moderate success with the
establishment of the Irish Free State and the Irish Republic but has yet
to achieve a united Ireland despite experiencing a limited success in the
Good Friday Agreement (1988).
Krause’s scholarship is impeccable. He looks at four well-known
national movements through an analysis of 40 groups in 44 campaigns
over 140 years of nationalist aspirations and struggle. The result is welldocumented and articulated support for his theory of rebel organizational
prowess and power known as Movement Structure Theory. He relies
upon a comprehensive blend of fieldwork that includes interviews with
members of the nationalist movements such as Zohra Drif, the milkbar bomber from the Battle of Algiers; Irish republican Gerry Adams;
Palestinian activist Leila Khaled; and Irgun member Yoske Nachmias.
These interviews are augmented by studies, archival sources (both
primary and secondary) and detailed modeling of the timelines of success
and failure. For Krause, the success or failure of a national movement
is determined by the relative power of its constituent groups. Internal
balance of power rather than ideology and external factors are more
likely to determine a movement’s outcomes. Four types of organizational
actors are identified: hegemons, leaders, challengers, and subordinates.
The text is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 1, “Power Violence,
and Victory,” provides an introduction, identifies the shortfalls of
competing theories, provides definitions and describes the research
design. Chapter 2, “Why National Movements Compete, Fight,
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and Win,” elaborates on Krause’s Movement Structure Theory, the
importance of power relationships within the national movement,
success, failure, and the instrumental use of violence. The roles of
hegemonic groups in defining a movement’s purpose that lead to a
“hegemonic movement” capable of moderating violence is crucial.
Fragmented movements comprised of strong leading groups (leaders)
with competitors (challengers) and subordinates (weak participants) are
less likely to succeed and more likely to act as spoilers using violence to
strengthen their position and to gain relative political strength.
The case studies are presented in the following four chapters. Each
of these succinctly presents the timeline of organizational struggle and
relative success with the respective national movements. The cases are
terse and analytically sound. What they miss in color commentary and
detail they more than make up for in analytical rigor. While at times
dense, the ample use of tables and figures summarizing the movements’
revolutionary progress makes the argument accessible and illuminates
the cases.
Chapter 3, “The Palestinian National Movement: The Sisyphean
Tragedy of Fragmentation,” shows how the Palestinian Movement has
been limited by internal struggles for power and domination leading to
a series of failures punctuated by moderate successes when a hegemon
(Fatah) dominated the movement. Chapter 4, “The Zionist Movement:
Victory Hanging in the Balance,” looks at the conditions that led the
Haganah to become the hegemonic ruler and control their rivals the
Irgun and Stern Gang (Lehi) and consolidate power at the founding of
the State of Israel.
Chapter 5, “The Algerian National Movement: The Long, Bloody
March to Hegemony,” tells the story of the ultimate success of the
National Liberation Front (FLN) in gaining Algeria’s independence
from France. The Algerian revolution was bloody and only through
brutally suppressing competing factions and conducting spoiling attacks
on civilians was the FLN able to gain hegemonic status. The Battle
of Algiers was won by France but the aftermath was exploited by the
FLN. The hegemonic lock on power gave the FLN the stature needed
to gain international support and a seat at the bargaining table with the
Métropole in Evian. The rhythm of fragmentation and violent contest is
described ably in the text, figures, and tables.
Chapter 6, “The Irish National Movement: Where You Stand
Depends Upon Where You Sit,” looks at the Irish nationalist and
republican movements and their internal competition for power. It
describes the conditions where Sinn Féin held hegemonic control over
the movement that led to a moderate success in the establishment of the
Irish Free State. The years of fragmented intramovement competition
that persisted through The Troubles were partially reversed when Sinn
Féin and the Irish Republican Army became hegemonic and embraced
nonviolent political action.
Chapter 7, “The Politics of National Movements and the Future of
Rebel Power,” provides a conclusion, summarizing each of the cases
studies and associated variables. It also discusses potential gaps in the
theory and provides suggestions for future research. All in all, the text
is an excellent contribution to understanding the internal dynamics
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of nationalist movements and their prospects for success under
disparate conditions.
As the case studies make clear, the French, British, and Israeli
intelligence services recognized the weaknesses deriving from internal
fragmentation and sought to exploit them. When a group overcame
these internal struggles and gained supremacy, they demonstrated
the ability to govern and gained a seat at the bargaining table.
Policymakers, senior strategic leaders, intelligence analysts, and
hopefully war college students will read the lessons and apply them to
their strategic intelligence assessments.

The Sword’s Other Edge: Trade-offs in
the Pursuit of Military Effectiveness
Edited by Dan Reiter
Reviewed by Dr. Benjamin Jensen, associate professor at the Marine Corps
University Command and Staff College and Scholar-in-Residence at the
American University School of International Service
New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2017
288 pages
$99.99

T

his edited volume complements the literature on military effectiveness
in political science and history. The editor, Dan Reiter, has been
at the forefront of debates about the attributes of effective military
organizations along with Allan Stam, Risa Brooks, Elizabeth Stanley,
Caitlin Talmadge, Jason Lyall, Austin Long, Jenna Jordan, and Stephen
Biddle. Similarly, historians have long examined major campaigns, with
a particular emphasis on the Second World War, to identify what makes
effective military organizations. This question is central to the military
profession and should be explored across the professional military
education continuum.
The book’s major contribution involves trade-offs in its pursuit of
military effectiveness that fall into three categories: political support,
security threats, and warfighting. Multiple chapters explore political
support as it relates to domestic politics and how gaining support for
contemporary security operations comes at the expense of important
constraints and restraints. Trade-offs with respect to security threats
are treated broadly as seen in Rosella Cappella Zielinski’s analysis of
how war financing affects public support and an array of political and
economic challenges beyond the battlefield.
With respect to warfighting, chapters by Jason Lyall and Michael
Horowitz explore how tactical-level necessities, from political officers
motivating troops to the susceptibility of unmanned systems to hacking
and spoofing, can generate suboptimal returns at the strategic level. The
book also explores critical trade-offs at the level of campaign plans: how
military effectiveness can create escalation traps. Caitlin Talmadge’s
chapter is a particularly important reminder of the value of escalation
control and how military effectiveness could lead to strategic failure and
nuclear exchange.
The book points to the need for a larger research agenda on
military effectiveness. Despite the wealth of literature on the subject,
there are still open questions and major conceptual issues that warrant
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further investigation. First, future work could explore the extent to
which adaption and military innovation are hallmarks of effective
organizations, and what factors produce more flexible and creative
military bureaucracies. Second, future efforts could explore strategic
mismatches such as the difficulty military organizations confronted
when learning in Iraq and Afghanistan and the larger relationship
between strategy and campaign planning.
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Civil-Military Relations
Redefining the Modern Military:
The Intersection of Profession and Ethics
Edited by Nathan K. Finney and Tyrell O. Mayfield
Reviewed by COL Douglas Winton, chair, Department of Military Strategy,
Planning, and Operations, US Army War College

Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press, 2019
264 pages
$29.95

N

athan K. Finney and Tyrell O. Mayfield, active duty officers in
the US Army and US Air Force respectively, have leveraged their
network of national security authors from the Military Writers Guild and
The Strategy Bridge to produce a unique assessment of contemporary
Western military service as a profession. This assortment of academics
and officers from four countries do not collaborate to provide a coherent
or consistent evaluation of contemporary military professionalism.
Rather, each provides their perspective on some aspect of the evolving
and somewhat amorphous topic to provide the reader an opportunity to
reflect on the condition of the profession and why that status matters.
The editors divide the collection of essays into two parts. Part 1
describes or elucidates some aspect of the military professional ethic.
Pauline Shanks-Kaurin argues military professionalism is an aspirational
goal whose value is more in motivating one to strive nobly than in
codifying a baseline standard. Thus, a hallmark of a true professional
is questioning and redefining the essence and limits of the profession.
Jo Brick, a lawyer for the Australian Army, examines the centrality of
trust in the military profession by drawing from her deep understanding
of fiduciary law. She shows how military professionals have a special
obligation to maintain the trust of society, the profession’s client. Casey
J. Landru provides a concise history of the changes in the American
military profession from the World War II through the post-Cold War.
He demonstrates the profession must change as the society it serves and
the character of war continually change. Hugh Michael “Mike” Denny
Jr. argues from his combat experience that the mark of a true professional
is knowing when to break the rules. While many will rightly question
how much is to be learned from one engagement, Denny shows the
importance of military professionals applying guided reflection as they
mature into positions of greater influence in the profession.
Perhaps, the true mark of a professional is knowing how to prevent
conditions in which subordinates feel compelled to be insubordinate.
Tony Ingesson, a former Swedish Army officer, challenges the value
of the military desiring the status of a profession. He argues military
decision-making is sufficiently distinct and noble from that of
standard professions and that servicemembers should embrace their
distinctiveness and eschew the needless label of “professional.” Rebecca
Johnson closes out part 1 by examining the relationships and obligations
of the military profession, the professionals it comprises, and the society
it serves. Her incorporation of the ethical responsibilities of the client
towards the profession expands the understanding of the military
profession in important ways.
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The authors contributing to part 2 illuminate the role of education
in developing and conveying the professional ethic described in part
1. William M. Beasley Jr. opens with an overview of the evolution of
professional military education in the US Navy from the era of steampowered propulsion to contemporary challenges, arguing each service
is a distinct profession with distinct expert knowledge. He critiques
the Navy’s prioritization of technical seamanship over the intellectual
demands of maritime strategy.
Simon Anglim, from the United Kingdom, contends education
steeped in history, politics, and culture is indispensable for military
professionals to understand the world and its people. Such understanding
develops the narrative that explains why the military is employing
violence on society’s behalf. A military professional’s education must
also address the ethics that govern the use of violence, the doctrine that
prescribes its employment, and the methods for integrating joint and
interagency partners.
Raymond A. Kimball argues from his military experience that
mentoring is as essential as education in conveying the professional
ethic from one generation to the next. Exploring literature of workplace
mentoring, he argues military services should not force mentoring
relationships but rather should invest in creating the places that draw
professionals together and encourage the mentor-protégé relationships
to emerge. Steven L. Foster, another US Army officer, provides a broad
overview of the origins of military professionalism and a personal
assessment of the current status. He concludes that despite recent
emphasis, the status of the US Army as a profession is very much
in question. He whimsically hopes potential changes in personnel
management systems and leader development programs will change the
Army’s culture and inspire a needed professional renaissance.
Holly Hughson uses her experience as a humanitarian aid worker
to maintain military professionals charged with managing violence
share an ethic with professionals who mitigate violence. Although
shared experiences in dangerous places provide an insufficient basis
for forging a shared identity, she rightly insists military professionals
in the twenty-first century should anticipate the employment of their
expert knowledge to be increasingly impacted by others interested in,
but not experts in, that knowledge. Brian Laslie concludes part 2 by
examining the development of the US Air Force’s professional identity
and thus provides an interesting bookend to Beasley’s description of
the US Navy’s professional military education that began part 2. Laslie
describes how pilots solved the oxygen deprivation problem that
grounded the F-22 fleet in 2011 and 2012, how the missile community
recovered from the 2014 cheating scandal, and how the drone pilot
community developed out of necessity. From these cases, Laslie claims
the Air Force’s professional ethic remains rooted in the insubordination
(euphemistically called pragmatic professionalism) of Brigadier General
William “Billy” Mitchell. This culture, he argues, enables the service’s
stovepiped communities to find independent solutions to independent
problems without relying on the service’s cumbersome bureaucracy.
Despite the wide variance of the authors’ experiences and training,
a few themes recur throughout the book. Most of the authors rely on
Samuel P. Huntington’s The Soldier and the State (1957) as the foundation
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for exploring military professionalism. Although none of the authors
sought to address civil-military relations between senior generals and
civilian policymakers, their collective recognition of Huntington as
the touchstone of military professionalism endorses Eliot A. Cohen’s
assessment of Huntington’s theory of objective civilian control as the
normal model embedded in contemporary understanding of civilmilitary relations.
The editors emphasize the roles of Morris Janowitz and Sir John
Hackett, alongside Huntington, in defining the profession. But the
contributing authors pay them infrequent lip service. Throughout the
book, the authors collectively emphasize developing and safeguarding
trust within the profession and with the society client it serves. They
advocate that to be a profession, servicemembers must develop and
convey a unique body of knowledge and corresponding ethic. These
reminders seem quite timely in this era of rapidly evolving and
diffusing technology, polarizing social and political views, and swelling
fiscal constraints.
The editors of this volume have done the profession a great service
by collecting and refining the ideas in this volume. They have not sought
to develop a coherent and consistent assessment of the profession and
thus tell us what we should think of its status and future. Rather, they
have gathered contributors who disagree with one another without trying
to win a debate. Thus, each contributor has added to the conversation in
a unique and helpful way and they have collectively reminded military
professionals and educators of their responsibility to join them in
developing and conveying the profession’s expert body of knowledge
and ethic.

Policing Sex and Marriage in the American
Military: The Court-Martial and the Construction
of Gender and Sexual Deviance, 1950–2000
By Kellie Wilson-Bufford
Reviewed by Dr. Daniel Beaudoin, professor of conflict resolution, civil-military
relations and humanitarian diplomacy, Tel Aviv University, Israel
Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 2018
354 pages
$50.00

K

ellie Wilson-Bufford’s Policing Sex and Marriage in the American
Military: The Court-Martial and the Construction of Gender and Sexual
Deviance, 1950–2000 makes an original and incisive sociohistorical and
legal contribution to the understanding of civil-military relations in the
United States. Much of the academic literature in the field of military
studies turns around hard questions of mission preparedness, strategy,
weapon systems, training, cyberwarfare, and force protection.
Contrarily, Wilson-Bufford’s refreshing work focuses on the
sociological and legal aspects of civil-military relations in the United
States and exposes the inordinate degree of involvement of the military
court system with the intimate private lives and the consensual sexual
relations of US servicemembers. Principally, she argues, “Sex and
marriage [became] extremely important areas of surveillance and control
in the second half of the twentieth century” (237). So central was marriage
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to the military during the Cold War that one judge advocate stated in a
written opinion, “Marriage is not an exclusively personal relationship; it
represents a status in which the Sovereign has an interest” (117).
The notion that sex and marriage are critical areas of societal
regulation in which the sovereign has a vested interest is not novel.
The French sociologist and philosopher Michel Foucault, arguably
the champion of this school of thought, maintained sexuality is not
only socially constructed, it must be socially regulated to maintain
hierarchies of dominance. A number of social institutions were, and are,
involved in this regulation. Schools, armies, families, police, prisons,
and others, contribute to the discipline of the body by participating in
social discourse.
In Foucault’s construction, sex cannot exist outside of an
institutionally supported rational law that creates and defines it. “Sex,”
writes Foucault, “is the most speculative, most ideal, and most internal
element in a deployment of sexuality organized by power in its grip
on bodies and their materiality, their forces, energies, sensations, and
pleasures” (Sexuality and Psychoanalysis, 1978, 155).
One may assume Wilson-Bufford had Foucault in mind, considering
she applied Foucauldian analysis to the military as a social institution. Her
analysis illustrates how this surveillance, control, and social regulation
in the military was rooted first and foremost in the Uniform Code of
Military Justice, which demanded “good order and discipline” among
the troops (article 134). This included idealizing servicemen as the
courageous protectors and loyal providers of the families and codified
into military law a set of rules and values aimed at achieving uniformity
in thought and action among members of the military community (44).
This drive for uniformity was a national as well as an international
endeavor. Nationally, in the post-World War II era, US political legal and
social institutions idealized nuclear families as the antidote to political
sexual radicalism: “Insecurities abroad motivated many Americans at
home to seek stability and happiness through marriage, parenthood,
and traditional gender roles” (18). Moreover, the military’s model of
heterosexual marriage, which promoted powerful masculinity, was a
sacred medium through which service husbands and dependent wives
transmitted cherished beliefs about morality, responsibility, and social
obligation to younger generations of military children (20). Even those
alien wives who married American servicemen overseas were strongly
encouraged to participate in command-sponsored guidance classes,
where military chaplains counseled them on Western moral values and
the importance of maintaining “high standards of social conduct” in
their new military communities (76).
An interesting question left unanswered in the book, and perhaps
worthy of further scrutiny is to what extent does this sexual regulation
impact US military mission capabilities and readiness? Furthermore,
articles 133 and 134 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice have not
been amended to reflect the changing ratio of sexes within the US armed
forces. It would be intriguing to learn whether such social movements
as Me Too will lead to societal pressure on the military to modify
those articles (241).
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For female servicemembers seeking justice in military courts, the
implications from this study are disturbing. In numerous cases of rape
and sexual assault in the 1980s and 1990s, “active-duty female victims
were blamed for making themselves vulnerable to attack simply by
pursuing careers in male-dominated fields” (241). This accusation is
particularly concerning considering recent reports of sexual assault in
the US military increased by nearly 10 percent in 2017 according to the
Pentagon’s annual study. Are women to blame for stepping outside the
dictated legal and normative constraints of an archaic system?
The lessons learned from Wilson-Bufford’s book are salient and
pressing. The military is a microcosm of society, and it remains vital
to encourage a critical discourse between the two in order to allow the
military to carry out its mission without compromising the sexual and
gendered rights of its members.

The Ethics of War and Peace Revisited
Edited by Daniel R. Brunstetter and Jean-Vincent Holeindre
Reviewed by Dr. C. Anthony Pfaff, Research Professor for Military Profession
and Ethic at the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College

T
Washington, DC:
Georgetown University
Press, 2019
344 pages
$110.95

raditional just war theory (JWT) can be a clumsy tool for analyzing
contemporary conflict. Its standard categories of jus ad bellum and jus
in bello govern the behavior of states and often draw a bright line between
conditions of war and peace, where absent a violation of sovereignty or
territory, military force is not permitted. Of course, the theory, or at least
its application, has evolved. Notable in this evolution is the emphasis on
addressing gross human rights violations or humanitarian crises. Scholars
have also added the categories of jus ad vim (justice of force short of
war), which governs the use of force below the threshold of violating
sovereignty and territory, and jus post bellum (justice after war), which
governs the termination of conflict.
These additions, while welcome, have proved inadequate. The rise
of nonstate actors, hybrid warfare, and the proliferation of weapons
of mass disruption and destruction do not so much challenge state
sovereignty as much as make it increasingly irrelevant. This is the subject
of The Ethics of War and Peace Revisited, edited by Daniel R. Brunstetter
and Jean-Vincent Holeindre. This volume addresses what is probably
the twenty-first century’s biggest security problem: the erosion of
sovereignty. The essential premise is conflict arises where sovereignty
is either contested or fragmented. Sovereignty is contested when brutal
acts against a population undermine the absolute nature of sovereignty
as a state’s right. It is fragmented when states cannot control all the
territory and permit the rise of terrorist groups or other nonstate actors
who project force beyond those borders. In such an environment,
permission to conduct humanitarian interventions seems too anemic
and the permission to conduct relentless and ongoing drone strikes
against terrorists seems to be too much. What is needed is another way.
This book, however, does not offer a revision of the theory. Rather,
it seeks to identify and then analyze the challenges this erosion of
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sovereignty creates and in doing so introduce the reader to the broader
discussion regarding contemporary security challenges—for example,
the fact some states cannot or should not control all their territory can
place incentives, if not obligations, on other states to intervene. But
as the intervention in Libya clearly demonstrated, even interventions
motivated by the best of intentions can lead to terrible outcomes. Since
it is hard to know in advance, should they be avoided?
To answer these and other questions, the book takes on four broad
themes: when to intervene, who bears the risks, how do we judge, and
finally, what to do when the conflict is over. Within these themes, the
book takes on a number of critical debates.
The first of these debates regards humanitarian intervention and the
responsibility to protect. Responsibility to protect is an emerging set of
norms that places an obligation on the international community, or at
least those who can, to intervene in areas where state failure (intentional
or unintentional) creates conditions for massive human rights violations
or humanitarian crises. While certainly noble in sentiment, Aidan
Hehir in his chapter notes too often such interventions, like the one in
Libya, turn out badly, leaving a “humanitarian intervention hangover”
that discourages future interventions. The only way to overcome that
hangover, he argues, is to establish a suprastate actor who can intervene
independent of other states’ interests or endorsements.
Thomas Lindemann and Alex Giacomelli, taking up Hehir’s concern
about self-interested interventions, argue identity plays an arguably more
important role in motivating intervention than strategic or economic
interests: some states just see themselves as “hero-protectors,” though
that does not mean they see every victim as worthy or able to be rescued.
Nigel Biggar argues perhaps we are over thinking the problem. One can
never predict all the consequences associated with interventions, so all
that should be required is a just cause and the necessary means to achieve
that cause.
The use of drones also figures prominently in this volume.
Contributors like Kerstin Fisk and Jennifer Ramos see the increased use
of such technology as a function of the precedent set by the US invasion
of Iraq, which enabled preventive, open-ended, but limited use of force.
As a result, a number of states are investing in the means to do so, which
risks a rise in cross-border attacks by adversary states. In this regard, one
of the values of this book is it takes up a range of issues, including this
one, from different perspectives. In particular, Jean-Baptiste Jeangene
Vilmer examines the drone debate from the French perspective,
ultimately arguing to the extent drones are a better alternative to more
conventional means in terms of limiting collateral harm, states should
consider their use. Shannon French, Victoria Sisk, and Caroline Bass
examine the problem in terms of its corrosive effect on the “warrior’s
code,” arguing that as drones distance combatants from the experience
of war, it also risks undermining their commitment to its rules.
Brunstetter helpfully observes part of the problem is that the
erosion of sovereignty creates space where the rules we have do not
seem to fit: the rules of war seem to permit too much; however, the
rules of law enforcement seem to permit too little. Thus, what is needed
is not a revision of JWT, but an alternative. In this regard he sees jus
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ad vim not as a component of JWT but an alternative that has its own
corresponding ethics of not only when force is permitted ( jus ad vim), but
what force is permitted ( jus in vi) and what counts as a just conclusion
of the conflict ( jus post vim). In this vein, Frederic Ramel suggests the
problem is not in the rules, but in how we think about security in the first
place. Rather than the state-centric approach described by JWT and jus
ad vim, he argues for a human-centric approach that orients actors away
from borders and towards freedom from want and freedom from fear.
If those conditions supplanted sovereignty as the things defended, we
could make better sense of what counts for when to use force and how.
The book ends on this last point: what obligations do states have
when the conflict is over? In this regard, Brian Orend argues while
wars may be fought to punish aggression, they should end with the
rehabilitation of the aggressor, a burden which falls to the victorious
party. Cian O’Driscoll helpfully argues whatever those obligations are,
what is missing from JWT is an account of what victory is. What sense
does it make to say the United States has jus post bellum obligations in
Iraq and Afghanistan if it is not at all clear the war is over? O’Driscoll
does not have a firm answer but argues more work needs to be done to
understand the relationship between victory and JWT.
By focusing on how the breakdown of sovereignty challenges our
traditional norms of war, this volume opens up space not just to better
understand the application of JWT, but also to consider alternatives. This
point does not mean the book is not without its faults. The discussion
on preventive war, for example, which takes place in the context of
drone strikes, seems to conflate preventive war with preventive strikes.
Traditionally, the former has never been permitted while the latter always
has. But even where the book lacks clarity, it still frames the debate
in useful ways scholars, students, and practitioners can get beyond the
simple application of the “old rules” and get into the discussion of what
the “new ones” should be.

Bourbon and Bullets: True Stories of
Whiskey, War, and Military Service
By John C. Tramazzo, foreword by Fred Minnick
Reviewed by Dr. Paul R. Kan, professor of national security studies, US Army
War College

Lincoln, NE: Potomac
Books, 2018
296 pages
$29.95

A

s a former bartender turned scholar who teaches at the US Army
War College and co-owns a local craft brewery, I was excited to
read John Tramazzo’s Bourbon and Bullets. So I poured myself some Bulleit
bourbon and opened the book.
From the early pages, I learned the founder of the Bulleit brand,
Tom Bulleit, was a US Navy corpsman during the Vietnam War. This
military connection is reflected in the core of the book, which seeks to
understand the significance of American whiskey and its “unbreakable
connection to our pursuit of happiness and the occasional call to arms”
(2). Through stories of past and present American veterans with links
to the uniquely American alcohol, bourbon, the book explores the
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“enduring relationship between American military service and American
whiskey, from the bottom shelf to the most elite heights” (11). The book
is a combination of Reid Mitenbuler’s Bourbon Empire, which details the
rise of bourbon along with the expansion of American capitalism, and
Colin Spoelman and David Haskell’s Dead Distillers, which catalogs the
individual biographies of American makers of spirits. Whiskey drinkers
and bar patrons will recognize the names Maker’s Mark, Jim Beam, and
Buffalo Trace but may not be aware of the links veterans have with
the brands. This book fills in this gap with anecdotes, biographies,
illustrations, and photographs of patriots who were also distillers.
Written with a flavor a general audience can appreciate, the
approach of discussing bourbon’s history sets the book apart from
other social histories that examine the important role of commodities
in shaping societies. Many social histories of alcohol, in particular, are
overly reductionist by arguing the market for a particular alcohol caused
individuals to act in ways to protect its manufacture, distribution, and
sale. These social histories reduce the outbreak of some wars to what is
poured into and out of a bottle. Tramazzo mostly avoids such material
determinism by having the bulk of his book discuss the warriors behind
the bourbon rather than bourbon behind the wars.
But the book is unable to avoid diluting its focus in the early
chapters. The first three chapters read as a hurried catalog of ways in
which military members not only produced bourbon but also when and
where military leaders such as General Ulysses S. Grant drank whiskey
and what veterans of wars wrote about bourbon. That today’s bourbon
has been “helped by strong sales among the military community” can
be said about any alcohol, or practically any readily available consumer
good (10). Given the sheer number of veterans in the United States, their
economic power is felt broadly throughout the American economy. The
book does not offer any supporting figures to demonstrate the armed
forces as a community have uniquely bolstered the bourbon industry,
past or present.
The strength of the book lies in the chapters profiling the veterans
and their families who were part of bourbon’s history. Kentuckian
George Thomas Stagg, for example, who joined the Union Army during
the Civil War because of his moral opposition to slavery and used his
sense of injustice after the war to break the widespread corruption
between whiskey distillers and federal tax officials who were choking
his bourbon company’s growth. These chapters are well-researched
and include solid sourcing; the latter chapters include interviews with
some of today’s veterans who are pushing the bourbon industry into
the twenty-first century. Contemporary craft distillers include former
US Air Force mechanic Donnis Todd who showed up unannounced
at the new, and only, Texas bourbon distillery, Garrison Brothers. He
proclaimed, “I’m Donnis Todd, and I want to make bourbon” (171).
After working without pay and living in a condemned trailer without air
conditioning or running water for months, Todd eventually became the
company’s master distiller. These and other anecdotes make bourbon’s
history come alive.
A more full-bodied explanation of what makes military service
and bourbon an interesting connection, beyond noting the various
ways they have been connected, would have added a richer dimension.

102

Parameters 49(1–2) Spring–Summer 2019

Did experiencing war change how distillers produced bourbon? What
qualities of a leader in the military and on the battlefield helped these
people contribute to whiskey’s history? There is some choppy writing,
and the need for better copyediting is noticeable in some glaring typos.
For example, there is an unfortunate typo in the last sentence of what
should have been a punchy end to a paragraph about President Taft’s
1906 whiskey labeling requirements—a decision that “lices (sic) on” (17).
These issues do not significantly detract from a delightful book, but
like having a good bourbon served in a chipped glass, they are hard
to ignore.
Any well-stocked bar would have many of the bourbons made by
the veterans detailed in this book, and any well-stocked library should
include this book on its shelves. After making the military-themed
cocktail recipes contained in the appendix, I am keeping the book close
to my bar at home.
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Biography
Presidents of War: The Epic Story, from 1807 to Modern Times
By Michael Beschloss
Reviewed by Dr. John C. Binkley, professor of History and Government,
University of Maryland University College

A

rticle II, section 2 of the US Constitution states in all its simplicity
that the president “shall be [the] Commander in Chief of the
Army and Navy of the United States.” While the language conveys a
title, it tells us nothing about how the president is supposed to undertake
such responsibility, especially during times of war. To help understand
the gloss on this simple constitutional command, presidential historian
Michael Beschloss authored Presidents of War, which explains how
presidents from 1807 thru the Vietnam War attempted to undertake this
most complicated of responsibilities—acting as a war president.
Beschloss’s approach is simple. Starting in 1807, with the decision
by Thomas Jefferson not to engage in war over the British attack on
the American frigate Chesapeake, Beschloss explores how presidents dealt
with their responsibilities not only during war but also, in some cases,
the more important role of a president before a war. Prior to a conflict,
a president must oversee diplomacy and convince the public a military
option is the best choice. This latter function becomes important when
one considers it is the role of Congress to declare war, and public opinion
becomes all-important in the decisional process.
Several patterns become evident from reading Presidents of War. The
first is the role of public opinion in supporting the decision to go to war. In
most cases, there is an incident that triggered public support. Sometimes
the incident was prevocational, such as the Mexican-American War when
James K. Polk ordered the US Army into the disputed territories near
the Texas and Mexican borders and then blamed Mexico for the ensuing
combat. The Gulf of Tonkin incident at the outset of the Vietnam War
is another example of such a prevocational incident.
At other times, an accident supplied the trigger for war. The
destruction of the USS Maine in Havana harbor became William
McKinley’s casus belli for the Spanish-American War. Finally, aggressive
action, either in the form of a direct military attack such as Japan’s
attack on Pearl Harbor and North Korea’s invasion of South Korea or
by provocative diplomatic action, such as the Zimmermann Telegram
during World War I, was all that was needed to solidify public support.
In each case, the president used the incident to gain public support
for a war, which the public had little appetite for entertaining prior to
the incident.
A second pattern is a constant conflict between the president and
the Congress, especially during the run-up to war and could continue
during the war. Abraham Lincoln was constantly fighting congressional
interference during the Civil War, and Franklin D. Roosevelt had to work
around Congress to provide support for Britain during the 1940–41
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period. To avoid congressional conflicts, some presidents have resorted
to duplicity. This approach has the appearance of “mission creep” in
which the war’s original goals are substantially expanded.
Sometimes presidents have intentionally hidden an expanded goal
from the public, understanding fully they would oppose this type of
bait and switch. In other cases, presidents have expanded their goals as
a result of wartime exigency. McKinley’s occupation of the Philippine
islands is a good example of the former while Harry S. Truman’s decision
to cross into North Korea is a good example of the latter. A third pattern
is the difficulty presidents have in ending wars. This is especially true in
the case of a declared war in which Congress has a role. James Madison,
Polk, McKinley, and Woodrow Wilson all confronted congressional
difficulty at the end of their wars.
Truman learned from Wilson’s failure to get Senate support for the
League of Nations and involved Congress in the process of creating
the United Nations. Undeclared wars raise an entirely different set of
problems regarding their termination. Yet they have proliferated since
World War II in an effort to avoid congressional involvement. But
the War Powers Act of 1973 reflects the reality that Congress can still
demand to participate in the process.
As excellent a book as this is, there is one problem which struck
this reviewer—the scope of the study. Why Bechloss selected Jefferson’s
decision regarding Britain as his starting point and omitted John
Adams’s Quasi-War with France 1798–1800, or for that matter, George
Washington’s management of the Whiskey Rebellion in 1794 is a mystery.
The omission of Adams’s conflict is particularly mystifying given
the fact his involvement with the French set many precedents. At the
end of the book, we confront the same problem. There is no real analysis
of George H. W. Bush’s handling of the Persian Gulf War; nor is there
much discussion of George W. Bush’s decisions regarding the Iraq and
Afghanistan Wars. While Beschloss may have felt the historical record
since 2001 was still unclear, the same reasoning does not apply to the
1990 war record.
Notwithstanding this minor issue, Beschloss has authored a
beautifully written book, which is deeply researched and brings a
human touch to a president’s decision-making process. This book is
traditional history at its best. Too often, books written about the power
of a commander in chief tend to forget presidents are human beings who
make mistakes. This is a book which should be read by both the general
public as well the specialist in military history or civil-military relations.

Crusader: General Donn Starry and the Army of His Times
By Mike Guardia, foreword by Martin E. Dempsey
Reviewed by Dr. Douglas V. Johnson II, former research professor, Strategic
Studies Institute, US Army War College
Havertown, PA:
Casemate, 2018
224 pages
$32.95

A

n easy and engaging read heavily laced with extracts from General
Starry’s personal papers, this book provides a combination of
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biography and history. Of greatest interest to professional soldiers
are Starry’s observations on the art of linking operational design with
technology, doctrine, and training. The operational concepts enshrined
in doctrine must flow from a thorough understanding of the qualities of
the technologies available or demanded. Likewise, the soldier and leader
training must mesh juniors and seniors into effective instruments for the
next war. These principles must be inculcated into the thinking of senior
commanders before they are translated into concepts for the effective
employment of military power. The author describes Starry’s constant
struggle to accomplish these aims in the face of fixed attitudes, sloppy
thinking, and occasional laziness.
One of the most disturbing aspects of this story is Starry’s periodic
inability to find sound, factual analysis as a basis for change because the
analysis he encountered was often weak or wrong because the “facts”
were not validated before changes were initiated.
Starry derived his contribution to the 1976 Active Defense
doctrine—established in the US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5,
Operations, of that year—directly from his investigations of the 1973
Yom Kippur War and the work he had performed in the Pentagon with
later-Training and Doctrine Command Commander William E. DePuy.
While at the Pentagon, Starry and DePuy had wrestled with not only
what the Army ought to be preparing to do, but also how to go about it.
Starry was tasked by Army Chief of Staff Creighton W. Abrams Jr., under
whom he twice previously served, to ferret out how the Israelis were able
to overcome the odds they had confronted in war, seeing it as a possible
preview of a conflict between NATO and the Soviet Union.
The most important contribution Starry made to the defense of
the nation and NATO, however, was in his development and carefully
crafted support for AirLand Battle doctrine and the 1982 version of FM
100-5. This reviewer arrived in Europe in 1977, as Active Defense was
being digested (or indigested accordingly). With what seemed to have
been almost no thought given to offensive action, which was actually not
the case, the document lacked emphasis and felt un-American to those of
us on the ground. The lack of a deep-attack concept was not articulated
at the time, as the Army was wrestling with the more normative remark
that quantity had a quality all its own: the knowledge that an imbalance
in forces between NATO and the Western allies, in both numbers and
quality, simply invited NATO to resort to nuclear weapons early. Starry
and DePuy had realized it was the best they could do with the equipment
and manpower available at the time.
Previously, this reviewer participated in a wargame at the Naval War
College in which Colonel Richard H. Sinnreich, then-director of the
School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), managed the ground war.
Sinnreich launched a deep attack in accord with Starry’s 1982 operational
concept of how to stop the Soviets. The move caught everyone except
the SAMS players unaware, leading to intense discussions. Sinnreich
stood his ground arguing this was the new US Army doctrine whether
anyone liked it or not.
The contrast between this and the former doctrine is perhaps best
exemplified by another moment of truth in an earlier wargame played
out under the Active Defense doctrine at SAMS. With a German officer
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playing the role of commander in chief of the Central Army Group, the
Active Defense strategy reached its limit and nuclear weapons offered
the only hope, the request for release of nuclear weapons was forwarded.
The acting commander in chief of the Central Army Group authorized
the employment of nuclear weapons so long as at least one nuclear weapon falls
on the Soviet Union. Starry had expertly described the ultimate bankruptcy
of Active Defense which made the early release and targeting of forces
arrayed in East Germany the final act. The wargame ceased at that point,
and energetic debates followed.
By 1982, the deficiencies of 1973 were well on the way to being
healed. Guardia is careful to include Starry’s evaluations of Soviet
reactions thereto, which are among the most interesting passages in the
book. In every major event recorded in this work, Starry follows pretty
much the same process: seek the truth, understand the context, search
out possible solutions, and look downrange. In analyzing performances
of Starry and several senior officers for whom he developed “no regard”
(a phrase of as serious condemnation as he would utter in public), the
reader gains a reasonably solid picture of a man on a mission who has
mastered a technique for positive, measurable progress.
I admit partiality to General Starry. But this book will easily serve
as a starting point for deeper investigations, which must include the
interviews contained in the US Army Heritage and Education Center.
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World War I
Thunder in the Argonne: A New History
of America’s Greatest Battle
By Douglas V. Mastriano
Reviewed by Dr. James Scudieri, chief, Military History Institute, U. S. Army
Heritage and Education Center

T

his book assesses strategic, operational, and tactical details of the
American Expeditionary Forces’s (AEF) 1918 Meuse-Argonne
offensive under General John J. “Black Jack” Pershing. Chapters 1–5
provide a prewar background, the war to date, American unpreparedness,
Allied planning beyond reaction to the German 1918 offensives, and
the AEF’s preliminary battle at Saint-Mihiel. Chapters 6–15 follow the
AEF chronologically: commencement, a slowdown in late September,
and stalemate in October. Separate chapters showcase the famous “Lost
Battalion,” Corporal Alvin York, and efforts to break the German’s
Siegfried Line. Chapter 16 ranges from AEF expansion to French Premier
Georges Clemenceau’s frustrations with Pershing, for which Supreme
Allied Commander Ferdinand Foch was intermediary to temper. Chapter
17 closes the October stalemate. Chapters 18–21 dissect American
operations in November: the long-awaited crossing of the Meuse, the
mad dash to Sedan, and finally war’s end.
Among the book’s several themes is a familiar indictment of
Woodrow Wilson’s administration. The perspective would benefit from
an appreciation of the president’s challenges as articulated by Justus D.
Doenecke in Nothing Less Than War: A New History of America’s Entry into
World War I (2011). Another theme is Pershing’s severe shortcomings. He
had fanciful tactical notions unsuitable for the Western Front and was
impatient, both of which resulted in costly frontal assaults. Pershing also
fostered a poor command climate that squelched subordinates’ initiative
and innovation. Inadequately credited in this book is the astounding
growth of an officer who had been a mere captain until 1906.
There is much tactical detail involved with dissecting how the AEF
learned its trade in the most demanding, merciless form of on-the-job
training, wherein battles were learning laboratories. These assessments
are balanced, and the depth of research provides similar details for the
enemy, specifically Bavarians, Saxons, and so forth. This comparative
analysis is most effective.
Various chapters comment on military concepts, such as principles
of war, the center of gravity, and decisive points as well as current Army
doctrine. These references often seem contrived. They, nonetheless,
provide grist for deeper thought. Although a campaign study heavy
in tactical details, the book also provides numerous insights, if not
lessons learned.
More specifically, aspects of the AEF experience explore
organizational readiness at multiple levels and preparedness for the
changing characteristics of warfare any army will face. Success often
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rested upon the ability to think and to act in terms of what is now today’s
Army mission command. The Meuse-Argonne campaign demanded
leadership and staff skills to orchestrate combined arms operations at
the multidivision and multicorps levels, whether in allied or coalition
environments, and the learning curves were steep.
The AEF’s adoption of the creeping barrage on November 1–4, 1918,
employed techniques that the British had matured since the disastrous
first day on the Somme more than two years earlier. The book notes the
importance of French assistance, especially liaison officers. Of greater
importance would have been an analysis to determine the extent British
and Australian planners had supplemented American staffs. Readers
also miss how the AEF transitioned from positional trench warfare in
1917–18, to maneuver warfare in late 1918, to military occupation and
stability operations in late 1918 into the early 1920s.
AEF General Headquarter’s mindset of “On to Sedan” set the stage
for one of the greatest catastrophes of the war. General Headquarter’s
favoritism for 1st Division and its commander’s decision to get to Sedan
rapidly by cutting across the fronts of both 42nd and 77th Divisions on
the American side of the Meuse, wrought havoc. More damning still is
the description of American casualties suffered in the last five hours of
war from sunrise just before 6:00 a.m. to the armistice at 11:00 a.m. on
November 11.
This work performs a great service to remind current generations
about what their army accomplished in record time. The integration
operations and battles from the army to the company level with many,
little-known individual stories is powerful. Victory rested upon soldiers
and marines called to war from all walks of American society.
More contentious is the AEF’s accomplishments in perspective.
The text gives fleeting rather than substantive credit to the Allies. AEF
divisions were too few and too late to play a major role in stopping
the five German offensives in 1918. The author notes the AEF was
approximately twice the size of Allied divisions, which were reduced to
nine infantry battalions. But the raw numbers of riflemen only tell part
of the story. Progressive Allied organizational and procedural changes
from the squad to the division and through the corps and the army
made them formidable. The Canadian Corps and the Australian and
New Zealand Army Corps incidentally maintained their 12-battalion
divisional structure to the war’s end, the former, in particular, with a
daunting artillery capability.
More problematic is the idea that French and British morale was
broken, which the AEF had to save. New civilian overlords Clemenceau
and British Prime Minister David Lloyd George demanded victory at less
cost in lives. The French Army of 1918 was not the mutiny-stricken force
of 1917 seen after the failed Robert Nivelle attacks. Similarly, the British
Expeditionary Force in 1918 was not the malaise-ridden force seen
after the Battle of Passchendaele. Neither force was the army of 1914.
Their troops defeated all five German offensives and counterattacked.
These counterattacks, the Second Battle of the Marne in July and “the
black day of the German Army” at Amiens in August were one and two
months before even Saint-Mihiel. But, the text makes bare mention of
them even though British church bells have rung on November 21, 1917,
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the day after Cambrai, and Armistice Day, since 1914. This reviewer
also notes there are excessive generalizations on Allied diplomacy and
postwar implementation.
The author’s penultimate chapter on recent efforts to restore
memory and provide recognition is both refreshing and inspiring. The
last chapter reinforces history’s value and the cost of unpreparedness.
Perhaps a digression for some readers, the text also bemoans the current
state of the US government.
The AEF’s challenges—successfully met—inspire questions for
today’s Army. Is the force ready for similar challenges and complexities
in the third decade of the twenty-first century? Is the Army prepared
for a return to major combat operations within the joint range of
military operations? How are the current brigade combat teams and
combat aviation brigades prepared to fight and win the nation’s wars
in the context of multidomain operations? How are the often-ignored
support brigades and the echelons above brigade and division levels
postured to provide the requisite support to sustain such complex and
varied operations?

Sons of Freedom: The Forgotten American Soldiers
Who Defeated Germany in World War I
By Geoffrey Wawro
Reviewed by MAJ Nathan K. Finney, planner, US Army Pacific

I

t is often said that, despite common understanding, the decisive winner
of the Second World War was the Soviet Union; its relentless pressure
on the Nazi regime (and Stalin’s willingness to throw millions of Russian
lives against the Eastern Front) ultimately defeated Hitler and his generals.
In Sons of Freedom, Geoffrey Wawro posits a somewhat analogous claim
of decisiveness about the American contribution to the First World War:
The German army, still three million strong and defending positions in
France and Belgium behind the Meuse River, decided to ask for an armistice,
not because it had been beaten by the British and French—who seemed
incapable of beating the Germans in 1918, or arguably ever—but because
it was beaten by the Americans, who broke through the eastern bastions
of the Hindenburg Line, advanced on both banks of the Meuse, and surrounded the German army in France. (xxiii–xxiv)

From this strong opening statement, Wawro spends more than 600
pages backing up his thesis with research conducted in the archives of
five of the six major belligerent nations of the conflict. Most impressive
is the ease with which Wawro transitions from the national strategic
aspects of the war to the tactical actions conducted by American soldiers,
each provided with clarity and excitement that allows for an ease of
intellectual consumption for the reader. While few histories of this type
can be called page-turners, Wawro has achieved just that.
Sons of Freedom covers the entire relationship of the United States
with World War I, from ambivalence to strict neutrality, then a reluctant
associated power to a decisive fledgling force who tipped the balance
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toward the Triple Entente. In the first six chapters, Wawro ably navigates
the nuances of global politics, state of the war on the European continent
prior to the entry of the United States, and finally the triggers for
participation and mobilization of American troops. The remaining 10
chapters zoom in on American soldiers fighting first among, then beside,
and ultimately independently of their French and British counterparts.
His treatment of the major battles in which the Americans participated
in 1918 is an exemplar of the fusion of traditional military history, which
covers tactical action by military units and the diplomatic and political
impact seen by those actions.
Of particular interest to readers of Parameters is Wawro’s treatment of
the major leaders of the war, especially the Americans. His assessment of
John J. Pershing is complex, acknowledging the general’s rare experience
with large troop movements from the punitive expedition into Mexico
prior to his selection as the commander of the American Expeditionary
Forces, as well as his unbending but paternalistic (in a positive sense)
leadership skills and understanding for what was required of a new, mass
American army. Sons of Freedom also details Pershing’s failures as a field
commander, “foolishly believ[ing] that he would ‘consume’ German
troops, [through frontal assaults and a near-religious belief in open
warfare] when, in fact . . . they would probably consume him” (308).
Wawro is equally critical of other leaders of the American
Expeditionary Forces, who like Pershing, were quick to demand initiative
from their subordinate leaders, but did not recognize the bureaucracy of
the Army—or the lack of training the leaders and soldiers had received
prior to throwing them into combat—did not provide the experiences
or background to foster leaders capable of adaptation. Indeed, most
AEF leaders were unable, and in some cases unwilling, to provide the
resources required to backstop the little initiative found on the Western
Front, leading those who displayed such qualities to fail and to be sent
packing to the depot at Blois (and such an officer’s career would have
“gone Blooey”). Much of what Tom Ricks described in The Generals (2012)
about George C. Marshall firing Army leadership who did not meet his
demanding standards in World War II was likely learned firsthand as he
ran American operations for the demanding Pershing decades earlier.
Sons of Freedom is an engaging, yet deep read of one of the major
conflicts at the foundation of the US Army as a modern institution and
America on the world stage. I highly recommend all Army leaders make
time to read and study this comprehensive account by Wawro, as the
First World War holds not only many lessons of our past but also key
dynamics we will likely face again in our future.
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Yesterday There Was Glory: With the
4th Division, A.E.F., in World War I
By Gerald Andrew Howell, edited by Jeffrey L. Patrick
Reviewed by Dr. Dean Nowowiejski, associate professor, Distinguished Chair
for Art of War Scholars Command and General Staff College Office of the Dean
of Academics

O

ne of the trends in World War I historiography is the initial
publication or republication of a variety of personal memoirs to
accompany the centennial of the war. Scarlet Fields: The Combat Memoir
of a World War I Medal of Honor Hero by John Lewis Barkley; Poilu: The
World War I Notebooks of Corporal Louis Barthas, Barrelmaker, 1914–1918,
by a French soldier; and The World War I Memoirs of Robert P. Patterson: A
Captain in the Great War, by the future undersecretary of war, are among
these recent additions. Now comes Gerald Andrew Howell’s memoir,
Yesterday There Was Glory: With the 4th Division, A.E.F., in World War I,
which adds to the story of doughboys and the 4th Infantry Division that
are still on active service today.
This memoir of a private in the 39th Infantry Regiment is really
the story of a soldier and the friends in his squad. How it came to
print through the editorial work of Jeffrey L. Patrick, the librarian at
Wilson’s Creek National Battlefield, is an interesting tale. Howell wrote
this work shortly after World War II, and his perceptions are colored
by the experience of a second global conflict. Howell offered the work
to a variety of potential publishers, but it was never published. Patrick
bought the manuscript at an auction on the internet and has done a
masterful job in bringing it to life.
Patrick’s notes are carefully researched through primary source
analysis in the National Archives and elsewhere. Howell’s descriptions
through the course of the narrative were matched by Patrick with
pertinent and captivating Signal Corps archival photographs. Patrick is
obviously versed in all the latest references and the evolution of World
War I historiography. And when you match this editorial work with the
intriguing perspective originally offered by Howell, this book becomes a
welcome addition to the common soldier’s historical account of the war.
There is much officer bashing as well as concern for food, clothes,
and shelter as you might expect from Howell, a private soldier. There
is also a sense of the unrelenting suffering from service in the MeuseArgonne offensive, as Howell’s retelling is a continuous narrative of
steadily impacting artillery, advances through dense woods, marching at
night to avoid German observation, and the misery of hunger, cold, and
filth. It reminds the reviewer of another period memoir mentioned above,
No Hard Feelings by Missourian John Lewis Barkley, a Medal of Honor
recipient, reprinted by the University Press of Kansas as Scarlet Fields
in 2014. That work similarly captured the bravery, tenacity, endurance
under raw conditions, and search for human comforts of the doughboy.
In Yesterday There was Glory, Gerald Howell captured the good-natured
banter of a World War I infantry squad throughout the war, complete
with the social jibes that reflected the evolving prejudices of soldiers
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who themselves were a melting pot. Howell’s account tells the tale from
mobilization to return home, with accounts of ship travel, training, rest,
and combat at Château-Thierry, Saint-Mihiel, and the Meuse-Argonne.
One of the unique elements of Howell’s book is his take on the
Third Army’s march into Germany at the end of the war and what it
was like to occupy the land of a recent enemy. He echoes other sources
on the length of the march, describing the exhaustion brought on by
the hike to the Rhine. He also reinforces the idea that the doughboys
quickly came to identify with the common German people as victims of
war. The focus seems appropriate to the centennial of the conflict, and
there is still much for the serious military professional or historian to
gain through the study of individual experience.

